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I. Introduction 
Social norms have long been recognized as an important influence on behavior in social 
sciences such as social psychology (Sherif 1936; Cialdini et al. 1990) and sociology (Merton 
1957; Coleman 1990). However, in economics social norms have received significant attention 
only relatively recently, mainly as a tool for explaining seemingly anomalous behavior such as 
involuntary unemployment (Akerlof 1980), conformity (Bernheim 1994), costly punishment 
(Fehr and Gächter 2000), tipping (Conlin et al. 2003), and macroeconomic phenomena, such as 
why consumption may track income even when wealth levels remain unaffected (Akerlof 2007). 
One possible reason for the relative absence of social norms in economics is that they are 
difficult to measure or quantify, making it hard to predict the precise influence they will exert on 
behavior. As a result, social norms are usually incorporated into economic research as post hoc 
interpretations for behavior or outcomes that are otherwise difficult to explain (Fehr and Gächter 
2000; Ostrom 2000), and they are identified primarily by measuring behaviors that are 
theoretically related to the norm (Fehr and Fischbacher 2004; Camerer and Fehr 2004). Because 
norms are usually studied indirectly in economics, they are rarely used to form precise 
predictions about behavior.1 
In this paper, we aim to put the horse (norm) before the cart (behavior), by introducing a 
novel incentivized method for identifying social norms separately from behavior. We use this 
method to measure social norms in several economic choice contexts, and then use these elicited 
norms to predict behavior a priori. We do so in the context of other-regarding behavior in 
variants of the “dictator game,” where recent laboratory experiments demonstrate that minor 
contextual features of a choice environment lead to substantially different choices and 
outcomes.2 We show that such changes in behavior are entirely consistent with varying social 
norms and with a stable preference for complying with social norms. 
                                                
1 A few experimental studies manipulate the likely presence or strength of a social norm by varying features of a 
choice context (Krupka and Weber 2009; Andreoni and Bernheim 2009) and demonstrate resulting changes in 
behavior that are consistent with the influence of a norm or a preference for complying with a norm. 
2 This apparent “instability” in behavior has led some researchers to question the value of generalizing from such 
laboratory experiments to the field (Levitt and List 2007). Our work at least partially addresses this concern, by 
demonstrating how such behavior corresponds to varying and identifiable social norms. The sensitivity of behavior 
in the laboratory to the context of the experiment can be interpreted in a manner similar to how behavior in the field 
is sensitive to context and to varying social norms. For the laboratory data analyzed in this paper, we demonstrate 
that such sensitivity may be explained once varying social norms are identified. Therefore, the reason why someone 
might share in one dictator experiment but not in another very similar one might be the same as why one tips at a 
coffee shop but not at a fast-food restaurant, or in the U.S. but not in Europe. 
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Rather than attempting to develop a theory of norm compliance based on underlying 
preferences, as in prior research,3 we start with the assumption that individuals care about 
behaving in a manner consistent with social norms. More precisely, we assume decision makers’ 
utility is based on the money they obtain and on the degree to which their actions comply with 
social norms, in the form of taking actions generally viewed as socially appropriate and avoiding 
those viewed as socially inappropriate. We then show that these two considerations – combined 
with a novel, incentivized method for identifying social norms that uses coordination games – 
can explain significant behavioral variation in dictator games. Thus, our primary contribution is 
an empirical, rather than theoretical one. We present and demonstrate the usefulness of a novel 
method for norm elicitation by showing that the elicited social norms – when included as a 
component of utility in a conditional logit choice model – can account rather well for behavioral 
changes in experimental data. Moreover, we also show that the weights placed on money and 
norm compliance, in the estimated utility parameters in the conditional logit model, demonstrate 
a fairly constant willingness to trade off roughly $5 of wealth in order to take actions that are 
socially appropriate, rather than socially inappropriate. The stability of these preferences thus 
allows a priori predictions to be generated for new dictator-game contexts, once one obtains 
measures of the social appropriateness of different actions. 
We begin by defining social norms and presenting a simple utility framework for 
understanding their potential influence on choice. We then demonstrate how one can use 
coordination games to identify the social norms that make up one source of utility. Using our 
utility framework, we show how the social norms we elicit from one set of individuals with the 
coordination games yield precise and testable predictions regarding the behavior of a new sample 
of participants, which we evaluate both with novel data from a new experiment and also using 
data from previously published experiments. We find that the observed sensitivity of behavior to 
                                                
3 For example, Andreoni and Bernheim (2009) explore situations in which one individual unilaterally shares wealth 
with another, and model a norm as the behavior that results from individuals caring about own wealth, intrinsically 
about fairness, and about how others perceive their concern for fairness. Their paper assumes an exogenously 
defined alternative (xF), on which there is implicitly agreement that it is the “fair” action for the decision maker to 
take, and they follow prior research in assuming that the equal (50-50) division of wealth is a natural reference point. 
They then show why pooling may occur at this alternative (as well as at other alternatives, under changing 
conditions). Andreoni and Bernheim acknowledge that xF may differ across contexts, and may thus account for 
varying behavior. This is similar to our main argument, that norms change across contexts, and can therefore 
account for changes in behavior, and suggests that our identification of what actions people agree upon as 
“appropriate” or “inappropriate” might provide an empirical basis for something like xF in their model.  
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several surprising experimental treatments can be almost entirely explained by variations in 
social norms. 
We choose to study behavior in dictator games primarily for two reasons. First, the 
simplicity and non-strategic nature of the dictator game make it easy to establish alternative 
environments in which we can hold constant important features of the choice faced by a decision 
maker (such as the set of possible payoffs and experimental subjects’ understanding of how 
actions map into payoffs), while varying the context in a way that is likely to influence norms. 
The non-strategic nature of the dictator game also allows us to rule out the possibility that 
changes in behavior are due to changes in subjects’ expectations about how opponents will 
behave, as would potentially be the case in a public goods, prisoner’s dilemma, or trust games.  
Second, a primary motivation in our research is to provide an interpretation for several 
recent experiments in economics (Dana et al. 2007; List 2007; Bardsley 2008; Lazear et al. 
2012), all of which use variants of the dictator game. These experiments show that alternative 
treatments that make seemingly trivial or irrelevant changes to the choices available to a dictator 
nevertheless produce surprising changes in behavior. We provide at least one possible account 
for these changes. Indeed, part of the value in our approach is that it can provide an explanation 
for why behavior changes across dictator-game variants in a manner not adequately accounted 
for by most current theories of social preferences.4 Thus, rather than adding to the literature on 
social preferences by conducting a “horse race” between different leading models, we purposely 
study simple decision contexts between which these models often fail to discriminate, and show 
that empirically-measured differences in social norms across these contexts correspond to 
observed differences in behavior.5  
By applying our norm elicitation method to our own and others’ dictator game data, we 
offer a unified interpretation of the behavioral changes observed across several experiments 
while simultaneously demonstrating the usefulness of the elicitation technique that we introduce. 
We also highlight the benefits of re-examining data from prior experiments to test novel theories 
                                                
4 In the Online Appendix, we consider several leading models of social preferences, and show that none of them can 
directly account for all the variation in behavior across the variants of the dictator game that we study here.  
5 Our approach might also serve as a valuable complement to existing theoretical approaches, providing a useful 
empirical input that can improve their ability to distinguish between environments that differ in social norms. For 
example, the norms that we empirically elicit could be incorporated into existing models of social norms, such as 
those by Lopez-Perez (2008) or Andreoni and Bernheim (2009) to provide a basis for why certain actions are 
considered “fair” or “compliant” with a norm, or to provide a basis for expectations in non-strategic settings 
(Battigali and Dufwenberg 2007). 
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and interpretations, as opposed to uniquely considering novel data generated solely for the 
purposes of a current test.6  
We should also note that, while this paper is the first to introduce the coordination game-
based elicitation method for identifying social norms, the approach has already been used in 
other papers. For example, Burks and Krupka (in press) apply the method in a real firm, to study 
how social norms regarding behavior toward clients differ between financial advisers and their 
supervisors, and show that mismatches in perceived social norms correlate with job 
dissatisfaction. In another example, Gächter, et al. (in press), use our method to elicit social 
norms in a setting where two workers provide costly effort to a firm, in a “gift-exchange” setting. 
They elicit norms to demonstrate that it is more socially appropriate to work hard when the other 
worker also exerts high effort, and compare the predictive ability of social norms to other social 
preferences.  
The next section presents our method for identifying social norms. Sections III through V 
demonstrate the usefulness of this method for predicting and explaining behavior in non-strategic 
choice environments. Finally, in the conclusion, we discuss related work that validates the norm 
elicitation method. 
 
II. Defining and Identifying Social Norms 
 Following Elster (1989), we note two important features of social norms. First, social 
norms generally prescribe or proscribe behaviors or actions, rather than outcomes. As Elster 
notes, “The simplest social norms are of the type: Do X, or: Don't do X.” (p. 99). Allowing 
norms to govern actions, rather than outcomes, suggests that two actions that produce the same 
outcome, but differ in other respects, may be governed by different social norms. Second, the 
“social” element of norms requires that they be jointly recognized, or collectively perceived, by 
members of a population. These two features of social norms – that they apply to actions rather 
than outcomes and that they must be jointly recognized – are present in most researchers’ 
definitions (Bettenhausen and Murnighan 1991; Fehr and Gächter 2000). For example, Ostrom 
                                                
6 While most experimental studies in economics (and psychology) limit their attention to a single dataset (usually 
generated by the authors), using additional, pre-existing data is valuable for the purposes of demonstrating 
robustness and generalizing findings beyond a particular experimental study. For other papers that employ this 
approach, see Camerer et al. (2004) and Hyndman et al. (in press). 
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(2000) defines social norms as “shared understandings about actions that are obligatory, 
permitted, or forbidden” (pp. 143-144, emphasis added).   
 Further, we distinguish norms regarding what one “ought” to do, or injunctive norms, 
from customs or actions that people regularly take, or descriptive norms. Both kinds of norms 
influence behavior (Cialdini et al. 1990; Krupka and Weber 2009). However, our focus here is on 
injunctive social norms, i.e., those described by Elster as prescribing what one “should do” or 
“should not do.” As we will show, (injunctive) social norms concerning the appropriateness of 
behavior are sufficient for explaining a considerable amount of variation in other-regarding 
behavior.  
 Therefore, following the literature, we define (injunctive) social norms as collective 
perceptions, among members of a population, regarding the appropriateness of different 
behaviors. They are things that people in the population jointly recognize one should or should 
not do, and people who belong to the population expect others to be aware of and understand this 
agreement. The power of social norms comes both from the willingness of people within the 
population to punish (or reward) others’ deviation from (or adherence to) them and from the 
experience of positive or negative emotions produced by one’s own adherence or deviation from 
a social norm (Elster 1989; Fehr and Gächter 2000; Lopez-Perez 2008). 
 To formalize our definition, let ! = !!, . . . ,!!  represent a set of K actions available to a 
decision maker. A social norm, ! !! ∈ −1, 1 , is an empirically measurable collective 
judgment that assigns to each action a degree of appropriateness or inappropriateness. Therefore, 
we assume that if for an action, !!, there is collective recognition that the action constitutes 
“appropriate,” or socially prescribed, behavior, ! !! > 0, while if there is joint recognition that 
an action constitutes “inappropriate,” or socially proscribed, behavior, ! !! < 0. Thus, 
consistent with the above definitions of social norms, ! !!  identifies the degree to which a 
specific action, !!, is collectively perceived as one that should or should not be taken. 
 An important feature of the above definition, and where we depart from some prior work, 
is that a norm is not necessarily a binary classification, such that a particular action (the “norm”, 
e.g., “tip 20%” or “the 50-50 split”) should be taken, by assumption leaving all remaining actions 
as those (equally inappropriate) actions that should not be taken (Lopez-Perez 2008).7 Instead, 
                                                
7 Such a definition is possible in our framework by, for example, assigning ! !! = 1 to only one action (the 
“norm”) and letting all other actions have a constant value of ! !! = 0. 
 6 
our definition of a social norm applies to the entire set of possible actions, and allows actions to 
vary in the degree to which they are perceived as appropriate. Thus, we can characterize a social 
norm by the profile of appropriateness ratings over all the actions available to a decision maker. 
For example, while there may be social agreement that it is always appropriate to arrive on time 
in many Western cultures, there may be some instances in which arriving 5 minutes late is less 
socially inappropriate (meeting friends at a bar) than others (arriving at a funeral). We will also 
see that representing social norms as a profile of appropriateness ratings over all actions is 
validated in our analysis of the experimental data. We show that even though the most socially 
appropriate behavior is the same across all the experiments we examine – share the experimental 
endowment equally (cf. Andreoni and Bernheim 2009) – we also find that differences in the 
relative appropriateness of the other actions exert an important influence on behavior. 
 To embed this definition of social norms in a simple utility framework – which will allow 
us to subsequently estimate the concern that individuals have for norm compliance, relative to 
money – we assume that a decision maker cares about both the monetary payoff produced by the 
selected action, ! !! , and the degree to which the action is collectively perceived as socially 
appropriate: ! !! = ! ! !! + !" !! .    (1) 
The function !(!) represents the value the individual places on the monetary payoff; we assume 
that this function is increasing in ! !! . The parameter ! ≥ 0 represents the degree to which the 
individual cares about adhering to social norms. An individual entirely unconcerned with social 
norms (! = 0) will always select the payoff-maximizing action. On the other hand, as ! 
increases, an individual will derive greater utility from selecting actions that are socially 
appropriate relative to the utility from those that are not.8 
 It follows directly from these preferences that behavior may change substantially across 
choice environments in which the sets of payoffs are identical, if the social norms change. 
Consider two choice environments, ! = !!,!!  and !! = !!! ,!!! , such that ! !! = ! !!! >! !! = ! !!! . Then, if there exist no social norms in either environment (! !! = ! !!! = 0, 
                                                
8 Other researchers have noted that individuals care heterogeneously about norm compliance (Ostrom 2000, 
Andreoni and Bernheim 2009). Such heterogeneity in pro-social concern is also common in most models of social 
preferences (Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Andreoni and Miller 2002). Cases in which!! < 0, which we do not explore 
here, might correspond to individuals who are anti-social, or derive utility from violating norms.  
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for ! = 1, 2) the decision maker will choose !! in the first environment and !!!  in the second. 
However, if social norms differ between the two choice environments, the individual may select 
actions corresponding to different payoffs in the two environments. For example, if ! !! =! !!! < ! !! < ! !!! , then for some values of ! a decision maker will select !! in the first 
environment and !!!  in the second environment. This is in spite of the fact that the most 
appropriate actions, !! and !!! , are analogous across the two contexts. 
 The above framework, while simple, presents a potentially useful approach for 
understanding how varying social norms might affect behavior even when choice environments 
are payoff-equivalent. It also provides a precise, and testable, relationship between the degree of 
social approval of actions (! !! ) and individuals’ willingness to take those actions, provided 
one has a method for empirically measuring the “social appropriateness” of the different 
available actions.  
In the rest of this paper, we predict and explain behavior using elicited measures of social 
appropriateness (! !! ). We first measure social appropriateness using a novel incentivized 
elicitation method. We elicit social norms over possible action choices across different contexts, 
from individuals who do not make choices in those contexts. We then observe how well the 
elicited social norms, when integrated into the above simple utility framework, explain the actual 
choices made by a separate group of individuals.  
We measure the extent to which actions are socially appropriate or inappropriate by 
presenting respondents with a description of a choice environment, including all the possible 
available actions (i.e., ! = !!, . . . ,!! ). We ask respondents to judge the social appropriateness 
of each action – i.e., we elicit ! !! , for all !! – on a four point scale that ranges over “very 
socially inappropriate”, “somewhat socially inappropriate”, “somewhat socially appropriate” to 
“very socially appropriate.”9 We provide respondents with incentives not to reveal their own 
personal preferences but instead to match the responses of others. Thus, respondents play a pure 
matching coordination game (Schelling 1960; Mehta et al. 1994) in which their goal is to 
                                                
9 The decision to have only four appropriateness categories was made after considering the tradeoff between having 
too few (in which case it would be harder to discriminate between degrees of appropriateness) and having too many 
(in which case it might be too difficult for subjects to match on the social norm, perhaps leading them to attempt to 
match using other focal principles). Further, we omitted the “neutral” category, as this would have been a focal point 
separate from the focal point stemming from the social norm. 
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anticipate the extent to which others will rate an action as socially appropriate or inappropriate, 
and to respond accordingly.  
 Because social norms reflect “collective perceptions,” coordination games present a 
useful incentivized way to identify such socially held judgments. From a game-theoretic point of 
view, pure matching games such as the one we use in our experiment have many equilibria and 
nothing intrinsic to the payoffs of the game makes one equilibrium favored (or focal) over the 
others. Schelling (1960) theorized and Mehta et al. (1994) and Sugden (1995) demonstrated that 
prominence derived from common culture and shared experiences can create focal points. In our 
experiment, we allow collectively recognized social norms to create focal points in the matching 
game. Therefore, our elicitation method will yield a representation of a social norm if a) there is 
general social agreement that some actions are more or less socially appropriate, constituting the 
social norm, and if b) respondents attempting to tacitly match others’ responses rely on such 
shared perceptions to help them do so.10 
 We begin by focusing on two payoff-identical variants of the dictator game. In 
Experiment 1 subjects see a description of one of these two choice environments, including all 
the possible choices available to the “dictator.” From these subjects, who never actually play the 
dictator game described to them or see the other variant, we elicit social norms over actions in 
the described choice environment using the incentives we describe above. We then use the social 
norms elicited in Experiment 1 to predict behavioral changes across the two environments, and 
we test these predicted effects of social norms using data collected from a second, separate, 
group of subjects who make choices in one of the two environments (Experiment 2).  
 A second part of our analysis involves identifying social norms governing behavior in 
previously studied additional variants of the dictator game (Lazear et al. 2012; List 2007; Dana et 
al. 2006). Therefore, as part of Experiment 1, we also use our elicitation method to measure the 
degree of social appropriateness of different actions available in these particular experiments. 
We demonstrate that the identified social norms explain considerable variation across treatments 
in both our own experiment (Experiment 2) and across these previously studied experiments. We 
also use a conditional logic choice model to obtain estimates of the weights that individuals place 
                                                
10 Many previous researchers have noted the important relationship between social norms and equilibrium selection 
in games (Kandori 1991; Young 1998). Camerer and Fehr (2004) note that coordination games can be used with 
economic incentives to reveal shared understanding (see also Xiao and Houser 2011). 
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on complying with social norms (!) and on monetary payoffs in several of these experiments, 
and show that a stable set of weights can explain a considerable amount of the variation in 
behavior across these experiments. 
 
III. Identifying social norms in payoff-equivalent environments (Experiment 1) 
 Consider the following two choice environments. In a “standard” dictator game, a 
decision maker initially receives $10 while another person receives $0. The decision maker must 
then decide how much, between $0 and $10, in one-dollar increments, to give to the other person. 
In a “bully” variant of the game, the decision maker and other person both initially receive $5 
and the deciding individual can give or take any amount between $0 and $5, again in one-dollar 
increments, to or from the other person. Both choice environments offer the decision maker 
exactly the same 11 choices over final wealth allocations ranging from ($10, $0) to ($0, $10), but 
vary in the actions required to obtain those dollar allocations.11 
 While the two choice sets are identical in terms of final payoffs, they differ in contextual 
features of the actions required to achieve those payoffs. In the standard case, any outcome other 
than ($10, $0) involves “giving” money to the other person; in the bully variant all outcomes 
from ($10, $0) to ($6, $4) involve the decision maker “taking” from the other person. Therefore, 
it is possible that social norms governing the two sets of behaviors might differ, even though the 
resulting outcomes do not. In particular, we conjecture that social norms will differ over actions 
that involve “taking” vs. “giving,” holding the resulting payoffs constant, in a manner that makes 
actions that involve “taking” less socially appropriate. 
 To identify social norms in the two choice environments, we applied our elicitation 
method to obtain ratings of the extent to which different actions in the two environments are 
collectively perceived as socially appropriate or inappropriate. Subjects providing the ratings saw 
only one of the two choice environments, and received incentives to match the modal response 
provided by others rating the same choice environment.  
 
 
                                                
11 Our experiment joins other research that examines the effect of varying initial endowment levels, such that 
dictators may “take” money from the recipient (Cox et al. 2007, Swope et al. 2008). Our “bully” variant differs from 
the dictator games with taking options studied by List (2007) and Bardsley (2008), which modify the standard 
dictator game by introducing additional taking options (see Section V).  
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A. Experimental Design for Experiment 1  
 We recruited 199 subjects from populations of experimental participants at Carnegie 
Mellon University, the University of Pittsburgh, and the University of Michigan.12 Participants 
received $7 for showing up to the experiment and could earn additional money from a task in 
which they attempted to match others’ appropriateness ratings. Subject payment in the matching 
task was not tied to the hypothetical dictator games about which they read. 
 The instructions (see Online Appendix) explained that subjects would read descriptions 
of different situations in which a person (“Individual A”) faced a choice among several possible 
alternatives. For each situation, subjects were asked to rate the extent to which each alternative 
available to the person was “‘socially appropriate’ and ‘consistent with moral or proper social 
behavior’ or ‘socially inappropriate’ and ‘inconsistent with moral or proper social behavior.’”  
Participants then read, as an example, a hypothetical situation and were shown how they 
might indicate their ratings for each action in this situation.13 After subjects were led through the 
example situation, but before they began to fill out the tables for the actual situations, they were 
told that one of the situations for which they were to provide appropriateness ratings would be 
selected at random at the end of the session, and that one of the possible action choices in this 
situation would also be randomly selected. If, for this action choice, the participant’s 
appropriateness rating was the same as the modal response in the session, then that participant 
would receive an additional payment ($5 in Pittsburgh, $10 in Michigan) at the conclusion of the 
session. Thus, participants were incentivized to match the modal rating in their session, for each 
possible action. 
Subjects then saw a description of either the standard or bully variant of the dictator 
game. Subjects in Experiment 1 never actually played this game, but only read about the 
situation and were asked to consider all of the actions that Individual A (the dictator) could take. 
In each session, only one of these two variants was used, meaning that no subject read 
descriptions of both the bully and standard choice contexts. The description of the situation 
                                                
12 Sessions conducted in Pittsburgh used 115 subjects and were conducted using pen and paper, while the sessions 
conducted at Michigan used 84 subjects and were conducted using the software z-tree (Fischbacher 2007). We find 
virtually no difference between the ratings obtained in Pittsburgh and in Michigan, despite there being differences in 
procedures (choices collected on paper in Pittsburgh vs. through a computer in Michigan; slightly different payoffs; 
sessions conducted years apart), indicating robustness of the social norms we elicit in these populations. We 
therefore pool across the two locations in the analyses. 
13 In the example, the decision maker found a wallet at a coffee shop and faced four alternatives: taking the wallet, 
asking others if the wallet belonged to them, leaving the wallet alone, or giving it to the store manager. 
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stated that the target individual (Individual A) was matched with another random and anonymous 
person (Individual B) and that both people would receive a “small participation fee” as well as 
any money produced by Individual A’s choice.  
The description then listed the eleven action choices available to Individual A. The labels 
associated with these action choices varied depending on which dictator game variant subjects 
were asked to consider (see Table 1). Subjects were also shown the monetary payments to each 
individual (A and B) produced by every listed action choice. For each possible action choice 
available to Individual A, a subject had to rate the choice as either “very socially inappropriate,” 
“somewhat socially inappropriate,” “somewhat socially appropriate,” or “very socially 
appropriate,” with the goal of matching this rating to the modal response in the session.  
In the above manner, each subject provided social appropriateness ratings for all actions 
available in either the standard or bully variant of the dictator game. This yields our primary 
outcome measured in Experiment 1 – the “between-subjects” elicited ratings of social 
appropriateness, !(!!), for the bully and standard choice environments.  
After rating all actions in either the bully or standard dictator variants, subjects then saw 
descriptions of either four (Pittsburgh) or five (Michigan) additional variants of the dictator 
game. Each situation corresponded to a variant of the dictator game used in previous 
experimental research (Lazear et al. 2012; List 2007; Dana et al. 2006). We discuss these 
variants in more detail in Section V. 
 After subjects indicated social appropriateness ratings in all choice scenarios, the 
experimenter randomly selected one scenario and one possible action choice in that scenario. The 
experimenter computed the modal response for that choice and privately informed subjects of 
whether or not their appropriateness rating matched the modal rating. Subjects were then paid 
privately in cash, receiving a $7 participation fee and an additional payment if they had selected 
the modal appropriateness rating for the selected scenario and action. 
 
B. Results of Experiment 1 
 Recall that we conjectured that “taking” would generally be considered less socially 
appropriate than “giving,” even when they produced identical outcomes. Therefore, we expected 
that, for those wealth allocations that left the dictator (Individual A) with more money than the 
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recipient, the corresponding actions would be generally considered less socially appropriate in 
the bully variant than in the standard variant of the dictator game. 
 We converted subjects’ responses into numerical scores. A rating of “very socially 
inappropriate” received a score of -1, “somewhat socially inappropriate” a score of -1/3, 
“somewhat socially appropriate” a score of 1/3, and “very socially appropriate” a score of 1.14 
Table 1 presents subjects’ social appropriateness ratings by condition. Each row corresponds to 
one possible action choice that Individual A could take and is also denoted by the final wealth 
distribution produced by that action choice, in the first column (payoff for A, payoff for B). For 
each of the two variants, the next several columns report first the action that the dictator had to 
take in order to obtain that wealth distribution, the mean of the social appropriateness ratings 
(ranging from complete agreement on “very socially inappropriate” (-1.0) to complete agreement 
on “very socially appropriate” (1.0)), and then the full distribution of responses. The final 
column reports the results of Wilcoxon rank-sum tests comparing the two distributions of 
responses. 
 Not surprisingly, the general pattern of social appropriateness ratings is the same across 
the two choice environments. There is substantial social agreement that the action that produces 
equal payoffs ($5, $5) is very socially appropriate in either environment. Further, maximizing 
A’s own payoff and leaving the other person with nothing ($10, $0) is the most socially 
inappropriate action in either variant.15 
 However, as predicted, we also observe that actions involving “taking” are generally less 
appropriate than those involving “giving.” For example, the action yielding payoffs ($10, $0) is 
less appropriate in the bully treatment than in the standard dictator game, and this difference is 
marginally statistically significant. Moreover, we observe even larger differences for outcomes 
in which the dictator obtains most, but not all, of the wealth. To obtain a payoff from $6 to $9 in 
the standard environment, the dictator must “give” to the other person while the bully 
environment requires the dictator to “take” from the other person to obtain the same payoffs. The 
                                                
14 We chose this particular scoring because it is intuitive (the least and most appropriate possible ratings receive 
scores of -1 and 1, respectively) and simple (possible ratings are evenly spaced over the -1 to 1 interval).  
15 Interestingly, actions that leave the recipient with more money (($4, $6) to ($0, $10)) produce less consensus. The 
modal and median responses lie between “very” and “somewhat” socially appropriate, but a significant proportion 
of respondents rate such behavior as socially inappropriate, and this proportion generally increases with other-
regarding inequality. This might reflect the belief that it is socially inappropriate to be “too generous” – for example, 
when one gives a gift that is too expensive or when one attempts to tip a member of a profession that generally does 
not accept tips. 
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ratings confirm our expectation that “giving” is more socially appropriate than “taking.” For 
every outcome from ($9, $1) to ($6, $4), the mean rating for the corresponding action is higher in 
the standard (giving) environment than in the bully (taking) environment, and these differences 
are all highly statistically significant. 
 Even in the cases where the ratings for the two environments diverge, subjects are still 
quite able to anticipate others’ ratings – the modal response almost always receives over half of 
the responses. But what they agree upon often differs. For example, for the wealth allocation ($8, 
$2), the modal response in the standard environment for giving $2 to the other person is 
“somewhat inappropriate.” But in the bully environment, where the same outcome involves 
taking $3 from the other person, there is social agreement that the action is “very inappropriate.” 
Similarly, for the wealth allocation ($6, $4), the modal response in the standard environment is 
“somewhat appropriate,” but in the bully environment it is “somewhat inappropriate.” 
 
C. Behavioral Predictions 
 The utility function in Equation 1 and the elicited norm ratings, !(!!), in Table 1 lead 
directly to two main predictions regarding how behavior will differ between the two 
environments. 
Prediction 1: More agents will select the action producing the equal-split ($5, $5) allocation in 
the bully environment than in the standard environment. 
Prediction 2: Conditional on not selecting the action producing the equal-split ($5, $5) 
allocation, more agents will select the action producing the payoff-maximizing ($10, $0) 
allocation in the bully environment than in the standard environment. 
The two predictions are straightforward, and result from the fact that the greatest disparity in 
social appropriateness between the bully variant and the standard dictator games are for final 
allocations between ($6,$4) and ($9,$1), with such ratings always lower in the bully case. 
The first prediction follows from the fact that the loss in social appropriateness from 
moving from the equal-split action to any action yielding a greater payoff for the decision maker 
is relatively greater in the bully treatment than in the standard environment. In the bully variant, 
every allocation that produces more wealth than ($5, $5) for the decision maker yields a lower 
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social appropriateness rating than in the standard dictator game.16 Therefore, selecting the action 
corresponding to the equal split will be more attractive relative to every other feasible choice in 
the bully variant than in the standard game. More precisely, an individual’s willingness to select 
the equal split action, !($",$"), over any other action that gives her more money, !! ∈ {! $",$" ,… ,!($"#,$")}, will depend on (i) her utility loss from foregoing the higher monetary payoff, ! $5 − ! ! !! < 0, on (ii) the degree to which the two actions differ in social 
appropriateness, ! ! $",$" − ! !! > 0, and on (iii) her concern for norm compliance, !. 
Since we assume (i) and (iii) are invariant for the individual and across the choice contexts, the 
individual’s willingness to choose the equal split action across the two contexts will depend on 
how ! ! $",$" − ! !!  differs between the bully and standard contexts. As Table 1 reveals, 
this difference in norm ratings is always larger in the bully context than in the standard dictator 
game. Thus, the equal-split allocation is relatively more attractive in the bully variant than in the 
standard game, relative to all other feasible choices. 
The intuition behind the second prediction is similarly straightforward. Conditional on 
not selecting the equal-split action, implementing the payoff-maximizing action, !($"#,$"), is 
relatively more socially appropriate – compared to actions that produce payoffs between ($9,$1) 
and ($6,$4) – in the bully environment than in the standard one. That is, the difference between !! ! $"#,$"  and ! !!  is smaller in the bully context than in the standard dictator game, for all !! ∈ ! $",$" , … ,! $",$" . 
Thus, in the bully environment, individuals are less likely to select something other than 
the equal split (Prediction 1), but if they do then they are more likely to take all the wealth 
(Prediction 2). Note that we do not generate a straightforward directional prediction regarding 
whether more or less will be shared in the bully and standard treatments. Instead, we have a 
slightly more complex set of behavioral predictions regarding how the distribution of action 
choices will vary with the choice context. A more concise way of summarizing our predictions is 
that more bimodal behavior will obtain in the bully treatment than in the standard treatment.  
 
  
                                                
16 Note that dictators should never allocate themselves less than half of the wealth because it produces both a lower 
monetary payoff and lower social appropriateness than choosing the action that produces ($5, $5). 
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IV. Evaluating predictions with behavioral choice data (Experiment 2) 
To evaluate the accuracy of the above behavioral predictions, we conducted an 
experiment that placed a different set of subjects in one of the two choice environments for 
which we collected social appropriateness ratings in Experiment 1. These subjects, who had no 
knowledge of the coordination games used to elicit social norms in Experiment 1, played either 
the standard or bully version of the dictator game for monetary payoffs. The difference between 
the two environments was whether one subject in a pair received $10 and chose how much to 
give to the other subject (standard) or whether both subjects received $5 and one subject chose 
how much to give to or take from the other (bully). The possible set of final payoff allocations 
was identical in both environments. 
  
A. Experimental Design for Experiment 2 
Our experiment took place at the end of several large lecture classes at Carnegie Mellon 
University. We recruited participants by asking for up to 30 volunteers to remain after class for a 
5-minute decision making experiment. Sessions consisted of between 16 and 30 participants. 
Participants received $2 for participating, in addition to any money from the allocation choices 
made in the dictator game variants described below.17 
Once all non-participants left the classroom we randomly divided participants into two 
groups, seated in different areas of the room. One group (dictators) received instructions, which 
were also read aloud so that the other group (recipients) could hear the instructions. 
In the standard dictator game, each dictator received a yellow envelope labeled “money 
for you” that contained ten $1 bills. The other group (recipients) received empty white envelopes 
labeled “money for other person.” Instructions were read aloud describing the choice, in which 
dictators would make a (double-blind) anonymous decision of how much of the $10 in their 
envelope to share with the paired recipient. Dictators made allocation decisions by distributing 
money between the two envelopes, similarly to Hoffman, et al., (1994). 
After instructions were read aloud, one experimenter collected the empty white envelopes 
from recipients and waited by the door to the hallway outside the room. Dictators exited the 
room one at a time, and each dictator received, from the experimenter, one recipients’ empty 
                                                
17 We recruited from science and math classes, which tend to be the largest classes outside of economics and 
psychology at Carnegie Mellon. While we did not collect gender information, our sample was predominantly male. 
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white envelope prior to exiting (the dictator already had his or her yellow envelope in hand). 
Outside the room, in the hallway, dictators found a large sealed box with an open slit at the top. 
As described in the instructions, the dictator privately allocated money between the two 
envelopes, placed the white envelope labeled “money for other person” inside the box, and left 
with whatever remained in the yellow envelope. This procedure allowed individual decisions to 
be anonymous.18 This concluded the experiment for the dictator. 
Once all dictators had left, one of the experimenters brought the box back into the 
classroom, where the recipients had been instructed to form a line. As each recipient stepped up 
to a table, one at a time, an experimenter opened a white envelope, counted the number of $1 
bills aloud, and handed the bills to the recipient. The other experimenter recorded the amount 
received by the recipient. This concluded the experiment.19 
In the bully variant of the dictator game, procedures were identical except that the two 
envelopes handed out at the beginning of the experiment each contained five $1 bills. The 
instructions informed dictators that they would be able to give up to $5 to or take up to $5 from 
the other person. 
 
B. Results of Experiment 2 
Figure 1A presents the results. There were 52 dictators (104 subjects) in the standard 
treatment and 54 dictators (108 subjects) in the bully treatment. The mean amount allocated to 
the recipient was $2.46 in the standard game and $3.11 in the bully treatment. The results in the 
standard treatment are similar to those in other dictator games: subjects share about 20-25% of 
the endowment and most dictators share some money (see Camerer 2003, Engel 2010).20 
Table 2 presents statistical tests of the changes in behavior across the two treatments. We 
include a control variable for the size of the class from which students were recruited – class size 
                                                
18 The box was placed in such a way that the experimenter standing at the door could see part of the back of the 
person standing at the box (but not enough to be able to determine whether the subject was reallocating money 
between the envelopes or when the envelope was being placed in the box). The experimenter could observe the 
subject departing from the box area, which allowed the experimenter to know when to send the next dictator out of 
the classroom. This minimal observation sufficed to prevent subjects from being able to open the box undetected.  
19 For accounting purposes, and to maintain anonymity of actions, dictators signed a sheet stating that they received 
a $2 participation fee as well as $10 to allocate between themselves and another participant. Recipients conversely 
signed a sheet stating that they received $2 and may have also received some money from another participant. 
20 The amount shared is higher than in other experiments with this high level of anonymity (Hoffman et al. 1994). 
However, the social distance between dictators and recipients in our experiment is probably lower than in typical 
studies, as they are classmates, and social distance is negatively related to sharing (Bohnet and Frey 1999). 
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ranged from 87 to 184 – since this is potentially a measure of social distance (Bohnet and Frey 
1999). As expected, class size is generally negatively related to amount shared. The first model 
demonstrates that more is shared with the recipient in the bully treatment, relative to the 
standard. The next two columns test the two behavioral predictions based on the norm elicitation 
results in Experiment 1.  
The first prediction was that more participants would select the action corresponding to 
the equal-split allocation ($5, $5) in the bully treatment than in the standard treatment. Figure 1A 
reveals strong support for this prediction. If we exclude those subjects who shared more than 
$5,21 then in the standard condition 8 of 48 participants (17 percent) gave $5 to the recipient. In 
the bully treatment, however, the proportion is much higher: of 49 participants, 18 (37 percent) 
neither took from nor gave money to the recipient. As model 2 in Table 3 reveals, this difference 
in behavior is statistically significant (p < 0.001), providing support for Prediction 1. 
The second prediction deals with what subjects do if they do not select the equal-split 
action. We predicted that, conditional on allocating less than $5 to the recipient, more dictators 
would leave the recipient with $0 in the bully variant than in the standard game. In the standard 
game, 40 participants gave less than $5 to the recipient, and of these 16 (40 percent) gave $0. In 
the bully variant, 31 participants took money from the recipient, and of these 16 (52 percent) left 
the recipient with $0. As we predicted, the percentage is higher in the bully variant than in the 
standard, and model 3 in Table 3 reveals this difference to be statistically significant (p = 0.03). 
The net result of the two predicted effects is that far fewer subjects leave recipients with 
amounts from $1 and $4 in the bully variant than in the standard dictator game. In the standard 
game, 24 of 52 subjects (46 percent) share an amount from $1 to $4. But in the bully variant, this 
proportion is much lower (15 of 54, or 28 percent). This difference is statistically significant in a 
non-parametric chi-square test (χ2(1) = 3.85, p = 0.05). 
To further explore how well our elicited norms can account for the data, we estimate 
Equation 1 using the appropriateness ratings from Experiment 1 and the behavioral data from 
Experiment 2. We use a conditional (fixed-effects) logistic regression, in which the (binary) 
dependent variable is whether an action was selected and explanatory variables are 
characteristics of the possible action choices, in our case each action’s social appropriateness and 
                                                
21 Such behavior is usually present, though rare, in most dictator experiments (Camerer 2003), and is inconsistent 
with most models of social preferences. Our results do not substantively change if we include those 9 participants in 
the analysis (4 in the standard game and 5 in the bully game).  
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monetary payoffs. For each alternative, we include the empirical mean social appropriateness 
rating (!(!!)) elicited from Experiment 1 (see Table 1), which varies by treatment. The 
coefficient for appropriateness ratings provides an estimate of the weight on social 
appropriateness in Equation 1, or !. To estimate the weight placed on monetary payoffs, we 
impose a linear restriction on !(!), such that, for any final payoff for the dictator, !, ! ! = !". 
Thus, we estimate the weight, !, that individuals place on the money they receive from a 
particular choice. The resulting utility function is, ! !! = !" !! + !" !! .     (2) 
We use conditional logit to estimate the two weights, ! and ! (McFadden, 1974). To account for 
the fact that our estimates of ! !!  are noisy, we bootstrap standard errors for the coefficients.22  
We report the estimation results in model 1 of Table 3. The coefficient for the 
appropriateness rating is positive and statistically significant, signifying that the estimated 
appropriateness ratings have a positive relationship with behavior. The positive coefficient for ! 
indicates that people care about their own monetary payoff. Moreover, the influence of social 
appropriateness on behavior is not just statistically significant, but also large in magnitude. The 
ratio, 2!/!, identifies how much money an individual is willing to sacrifice to take an action that 
is very socially appropriate (! !! = 1) rather than one that is very socially inappropriate 
(! !! = −1). This ratio indicates that subjects are willing to pay $5.66 to comply with social 
norms. Model 2 interacts appropriateness ratings with the non-standard – e.g., bully – treatment. 
The resulting coefficient is statistically insignificant and its inclusion has little effect on the other 
coefficients. Thus, in making their choices, subjects in Experiment 2 appear to care about the 
social appropriateness elicited from subjects in Experiment 1, and they do so equally in the bully 
and standard treatments. 
To get a sense of how well this simple utility framework qualitatively accounts for the 
data from Experiment 2, we calculated the predicted frequencies of choices in the two 
treatments, using the estimated parameters in model 1 of Table 3. These predicted choice 
frequencies are shown in Figure 1B. As the figure reveals, even though we impose a strong 
                                                
22 Specifically, for each model in Table 3 we obtain estimates of standard errors from 1000 replications with data 
randomly sampled (with replacement) from the original norm ratings for each scenario and from the choice data for 
each treatment, preserving the original sample sizes in each case. To explore robustness, we also show that the 
analysis in Table 3 is robust to using the median rating, rather than the mean (see Online Appendix). 
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linearity assumption on !(!), the estimated weights capture the general qualitative properties of 
the data in Figure 1A. For example, Figure 1B predicts, for the bully treatment relative to the 
standard game, a greater frequency of equal splits ($5), fewer choices that leave the recipient 
with between $1 and $4, and roughly equal proportions of choices in which the recipient receives 
nothing ($0), which are all consistent with the data. 
To summarize, Experiment 2 demonstrates that behavior changes significantly across two 
payoff-equivalent choice environments, in a manner consistent with the a priori predictions 
derived from the elicited norm ratings from Experiment 1. We confirm that changes in behavior 
are accounted for by changes in the social appropriateness of seemingly identical – in terms of 
payoffs – actions. However, to further test our interpretation for varying behavior in dictator 
games, we now turn to testing the extent to which elicited social norms predict changes across a 
larger set of choice contexts, using data from dictator game variants studied in previous papers.  
 
V. Re-analyzing previously collected dictator game data 
In Experiment 1, after providing ratings of the social appropriateness of actions in either 
the standard or bully environment, all subjects also performed similar ratings for other variants 
of the dictator game, each corresponding to experimental treatments conducted in previous 
research. The task of providing ratings was presented in exactly the same format as for the 
standard and bully variants – subjects saw a list of the possible actions available to a hypothetical 
“Individual A” (the dictator) in that particular experimental treatment, and then attempted to 
match the ratings of social appropriateness for each possible action provided by other subjects in 
the session.23 Participants’ incentives were identical to those for the first variant (standard or 
bully) that they had encountered. 
We now show that the elicited ratings are consistent with behavior in these experiments 
and that the surprising results produced by specific variants of the dictator game can be 
accounted for by changes in the social appropriateness of actions. We also explore the extent to 
which parameter estimates of ! and !, when combined with social appropriateness ratings for a 
new context, can predict surprising behavioral treatment effects, out of sample. 
                                                
23 The variants we studied differed in some cases between the sessions of Experiment 1 conducted in Pittsburgh and 
Michigan, as we make clear when this was the case. No feedback was provided in Experiment 1 until subjects had 
completed the entire experiment. That is, subjects first played a matching game for either the standard or bully 
variant of the dictator game, then completed matching games on other variants of the dictator game. After subjects 
completed the experiment, they received feedback about others’ choices in one scenario.  
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A. Dictator game with a sorting option 
Lazear et al. (2012) explored a variant of the dictator game in which subjects could opt to 
not play the game (by “passing”), in which case the dictator received $10 and the other 
participant received $0 without learning that a dictator game could have been played.24 The 
introduction of this option, which replicates the payoffs produced from sharing nothing, has a 
strong effect on sharing, as described in Figure 2A, which pools data from Lazear et al.’s 
Experiments 1 and 2. Mean sharing decreases by about 50 percent when there is a costless 
sorting option, relative to the standard dictator game in which there is not one. This is largely the 
result of a majority of dictators in the sorting treatment selecting not to play the game. 
To see why the sorting option is so frequently chosen (even among people who share 
positive amounts when no such option is available) and why behavior changes so significantly 
between the environments with and without sorting, we consider the ratings of social 
appropriateness given to actions in the two environments. Figure 3 presents the mean social 
appropriateness ratings for each action (represented in terms of the amount shared with the 
recipient, on the x-axis), both for the standard version of the dictator game and the variant with 
the additional ($10, $0) sorting option. The solid line presents the mean ratings (from Table 1) 
for the standard version of the dictator game; the dashed line presents the ratings from the sorting 
variant, conditional on the dictator choosing to play the game. The two lines are very close, 
indicating that social appropriateness ratings differ very little for actions in the dictator game 
based on whether subjects were required to play the game (standard) or had the option of not 
playing the game but then chose to play (Sorting (Play)).25  
The square in Figure 3 corresponds to the mean rating given to the choice of taking the 
sorting option and not playing the game (Sorting (Opt Out)). This action implements a ($10, $0) 
payoff outcome, with the recipient remaining uninformed about the game. Thus, the resulting 
payoffs are identical to those from playing the game and keeping all the money. However, as the 
                                                
24 This kind of game was also studied by Dana et al. (2006), who use a ($9, $0) outside option, and by Broberg et al. 
(2007), who elicit prices to opt out of the game (see also DellaVigna et al. 2012). We focus on Lazear et al.’s 
experiment in which the payoffs from the outside option ($10, $0) are identical to payoffs attainable in the dictator 
game. 
25 In all comparisons between actions producing identical outcomes, conditional on the dictator playing the game, 
the differences in ratings are statistically insignificant. Recall that roughly half of the participants, when providing 
the (sorting, play) ratings, had previously rated the standard game while the other half had not (they had rated the 
bully variant). The ratings for these two groups do not differ statistically.  
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ratings reveal, opting out is considered far less socially inappropriate. The mean rating is -0.07 
for Sorting (Opt Out) versus -0.80 for keeping all $10 in the standard game and -0.82 for 
choosing to play and keeping $10 in the sorting variant (Sorting(Play,$10)).26  
To see how considerations of social appropriateness are likely to influence behavior 
between the two variants, consider the relatively high social appropriateness of Opt Out, relative 
to the other actions that yield a payoff of $10 for the dictator. Returning to Equation 1, this 
relatively high degree of social appropriateness makes this action desirable relative to other 
actions, as it produces the highest possible monetary payoff at a relatively low cost in terms of 
disutility from social inappropriateness. Thus, people who select to share positive amounts in the 
standard variant of the dictator game might prefer to opt out in the sorting variant, which 
provides a large monetary payoff for the dictator ($10) with less disutility from violating social 
norms than would obtaining the same payoff when playing the dictator game.  
Using Lazear et al.’s data from Figure 2A, we can perform the same kind of conditional 
logit choice estimation that we did for Experiment 2, to obtain parameter estimates for ! and !.27 
Models 3 and 4 in Table 3 report the estimated parameters. As with the estimates for our 
Experiment 2, we again find that the coefficient for the social appropriateness ratings is positive 
and statistically significant. Also, model 4 reveals that interacting appropriateness rating with 
sorting treatment yields a statistically insignificant coefficient, indicating again that subjects 
appear to care about social appropriateness equally in the two treatments. Interestingly, the 
parameter estimates in model 3 are very similar to those in model 1. Indeed the estimate of the 
ratio, 2!/!, for model 3 is almost identical to the one in model 1 (5.68 vs. 5.66, respectively). 
Thus, our estimates indicate that subjects are willing to pay large and very similar amounts to 
comply with social norms in both our Experiment 2 and in the experiment by Lazear et al. 
Figure 2B presents the predicted choice frequencies obtained from the coefficients 
estimated in model 3 of Table 3. As with Experiment 2, the predicted frequencies describe 
                                                
26 The differences in appropriateness ratings between Sorting(Opt Out) and keeping $10 when playing the game are 
highly statistically significant (p < 0.001) both for the standard game (z = 9.12) and for the sorting variant (z = 
11.47). Interestingly, there is less agreement regarding the social appropriateness of “Opt Out” than there is for other 
choices in either variant. The modal rating is “somewhat inappropriate,” but there are high frequencies of other 
responses. This suggests that social norms elicited using our method could also capture the extent to which 
agreement regarding appropriateness influences behavior, beyond just the average appropriateness we use here. 
Since we find that mean appropriateness ratings (and median ratings, as reported in the Online Appendix) do well in 
explaining behavior in dictator games, which is the focus of this paper, we do not pursue this issue further here. 
27 We pool choice data from Lazear et al.’s Experiments 1 and 2, which includes both the standard and sorting (with 
a $10 opt out payment) variants. This is also the data used in Figure 2A.  
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qualitative changes in the actual data rather well, and generally capture the behavioral effects of 
introducing the sorting treatment. 
 
B. Dictator game with additional taking options 
We also analyze two variants of the dictator game studied by List (2007). In a standard 
variant, dictators divided $5 between themselves and another participant, in $0.50 increments. 
Thus, other than the endowment and the range of possible allocations, this treatment corresponds 
to the standard $10 dictator game we studied earlier. In a “Take $1” variant, dictators could 
alternatively take $1 from the recipient, an option selected by many participants. The surprising 
result from List’s experiment is that the introduction of the additional taking option causes a 
downward shift in the distribution of positive amounts shared, and dramatically decreases the 
frequency of people sharing half of the endowment. The data from List’s experiment is displayed 
in Figure 4A. A similar result is observed by Bardsley (2008). 
Figure 5 presents the mean ratings of social appropriateness for each action from the 
standard $5 dictator game studied by List and from the Take $1 variant.28 On the middle and 
right sides of the graph, when the dictator leaves the recipient with $2.50 or more, the ratings are 
very similar. However, toward the left of the graph, the ratings differ substantially. For any 
amount shared with the recipient between $0 and $2, the action is more socially appropriate in 
the Take $1 variant, when the dictator could have taken money instead, than in the standard 
dictator game; this difference is significant for all amounts from $0 to $1.50 (z > 2.45, p < 0.01, 
in all four comparisons using rank-sum tests). Thus, giving small amounts to the recipient is 
more socially appropriate when one could have taken money instead. For example, while sharing 
nothing with the recipient ($10, $0) is rated as very socially inappropriate in the standard 
treatment (-0.75), the same action is rated much less harshly in the Take $1 treatment (-0.26). 
The differences in Figure 5 can help explain why at least some individuals who share 
positive amounts in the standard dictator game may share less when the taking options are 
introduced. In particular, our appropriateness ratings identify a likely two-fold effect of 
                                                
28 The ratings for this experiment were collected only in sessions conducted in Michigan. In the earlier Pittsburgh 
sessions, we collected ratings on a stylized $10 version of the List experiment (for which choice data does not exist), 
and the analysis of this alternative data is reported in Krupka and Weber (2009). Additionally, the instructions in 
List’s (2007) on-line appendix mistakenly included a take $0.50 option, which, in personal communication, he told 
us was not part of the experiment. Some of our ratings of social appropriateness included this additional alternative, 
which we omit from the analysis. Omitting sessions in which this additional option was included does not 
substantively change the results. 
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introducing the additional taking option. First, the presence of this option makes keeping all, or 
most, of the money less socially inappropriate, thus making these actions more attractive than in 
the standard dictator game. Second, the additional taking option may itself be attractive, as it 
gives dictators an opportunity to earn a higher payoff ($6) than in the standard dictator game. 
Since we have choice data from List’s experiment and corresponding social norm ratings 
from Experiment 1, we can again estimate the weights that subjects place on money and norm 
compliance using the conditional logit specification. We report the results in models 5 and 6 of 
Table 3. We find that subjects in List’s experiment place more weight on money than did 
subjects in Experiment 2 and in the experiment by Lazear et al. However, the estimated weight 
on norm compliance is similar to those for the other experiments and is statistically significant. 
Moreover, as in earlier models, the interaction between social appropriateness and the Take $1 
treatment is not statistically significant, indicating that norm compliance is fairly constant across 
the experimental conditions. In contrast with the two earlier experiments, where we estimated 
subjects to be willing to pay approximately $5.67 to take an action that is very socially 
inappropriate rather than one that is very socially appropriate, we estimated a smaller amount 
here, 2!/! = $2.67.29 
Figure 4B presents the predicted choice frequencies, estimated from model 5. The 
prediction captures several of the key aspects of the results in Figure 4A. In particular, while the 
modal behaviors in the standard game are sharing $0 and sharing half of the endowment ($2.50), 
the modal behaviors in the take $1 treatment are sharing $0 and taking money from the recipient, 
with the latter more frequent. Moreover, the choice whose frequency decreases the most when 
moving from the standard to the take $1 treatment is sharing money equally. 
 
C. The stability of preferences across experiments 
 We have thus far shown that concern for compliance with the elicited social norms and 
for money can account for behavioral changes in three distinct experiments. An important 
additional question is how well a stable set of preferences – measured by constant values of ! 
                                                
29 This highlights a potential scaling issue, since an obvious difference between List’s experiment and the two other 
experiments is the size of the stakes in the dictator game ($5 vs. $10). Thus, the difference between “very socially 
appropriate” and “very socially inappropriate” might mean different things, in dollar terms, in games with different 
stake sizes. We discuss this issue further in concluding. 
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and ! can explain behavior across these experiments, and possibly others. We explore this 
important question in three ways. 
First, we can use the parameters estimated in model 1 of Table 3, based only on behavior 
in our Experiment 2, to predict behavior in the Lazear et al. (2012), and List (2007) experiments. 
In the preceding sections, we used the actual behavior in each experiment to estimate a separate 
set of parameters for that experiment. However, a stronger test of the predictive power of elicited 
norms, when combined with the simple utility function in Equation 1, involves making 
predictions across experimental populations, i.e., using the parameters obtained from one 
experiment or set of experiments to predict behavior in another experiment. 
We therefore took the elicited norm ratings for the Lazear, et al., and List experiments 
(from Figures 3 and 5, respectively), and used the estimated coefficients from model 1 in Table 3 
(! = 0.656, ! = 1.858), which were obtained using only data from our Experiment 2, to 
generate predictions using the logistic choice model. We report the resulting predicted 
distributions in figures in the Online Appendix. In both cases, the predicted changes in behavior 
when comparing treatments are generally consistent with the observed patterns in the data. Thus, 
important treatment effects in both experiments are captured by our approach, even when we 
used parameter estimates obtained from another experiment. 
Second, in models 7 and 8 in Table 3, we estimate the weights on monetary payoffs (!) 
and on compliance with social norms (!) using the data pooled from all three experiments. 
Model 7 uses the pooled data to estimate these parameters under the assumption that they are 
equal across experiments. The results reveal roughly similar weights on the two considerations as 
in earlier models. Moreover, the ratio 2!/! is equal to 4.95, implying that subjects are generally 
willing to pay around $5 to take actions that are socially appropriate instead of socially 
inappropriate. Model 8 introduces interaction terms for the two coefficients and the Lazear, et al., 
and List experiments. None of the four interaction coefficients is statistically significant, 
indicating that the same two parameters do a good job of explaining the pooled experimental 
data. 
 Finally, we can also study the extent to which our analysis allows us to predict behavior 
in an additional – slightly different – version of the dictator game, including another treatment 
that produces surprising results. In Experiment 1, we also asked subjects to provide ratings of the 
social appropriateness of different actions available to a dictator in a binary dictator game studied 
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by Dana, et al. (2006). This experiment included a “hidden information” treatment in which 
dictators were initially unaware of the payoff consequences of their actions for a recipient but 
could costlessly acquire this information, simply by clicking on a button. The surprising finding 
in this experiment was that many subjects opted not to acquire the information and, as a result, 
selfish behavior increased. In the Online Appendix, we show that the elicited norms, combined 
with Equation 1 and the coefficient estimates from Table 3 allow us to predict key properties of 
this treatment effect. In particular, our analysis predicts that modal behavior in the baseline 
(without hidden information) will be fair, that the proportion of such fair behavior declines 
substantially in the hidden information treatment, and that many subjects will choose to remain 
willfully ignorant. Thus, we provide yet another example of how the norms elicited for a 
particular context, when combined with the utility weights estimated from other contexts, can 
allow us to predict changes in behavior due to subtle treatment differences.  
 
VII. Conclusion 
 Our work makes two important contributions to the study of social behavior in 
economics. First, we introduce a novel incentivized method for identifying social norms that uses 
coordination games. Second, we demonstrate that the elicited social appropriateness ratings, 
when combined with a simple utility framework in which decision makers care about norm 
compliance and about money, accurately predicts behavioral changes across several variants of 
the dictator game. We also find a relatively stable degree of concern for money and for social 
appropriateness. 
 Of course, it is important to be critical about the extent to which we actually measure 
social norms, and not something else. In coordination games, there are multiple equilibria and 
subjects could coordinate in ways that have nothing to do with norms. However, we observe 
subjects regularly agreeing in their ratings, in a way that varies both between different actions in 
each scenario and across scenarios, and also in a way that corresponds to our intuitions regarding 
changing social norms.30 One might also argue that the responses correspond to what subjects 
                                                
30 Another way to test the extent to which our method identifies social norms is to see if it captures norms that can 
be externally validated. Another paper (Krupka et al. 2011), applies our elicitation instrument to measure norms of 
tipping and punctuality, how they vary by nationality, and how individuals recognize distinctions in norms across 
populations. We find support for the idea that our method measures social norms. For example, foreign-born 
students provide different appropriateness ratings when matching responses with US students than with people from 
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themselves would do if playing the game, or to what they think others will do. But, this 
interpretation suggests either that almost everyone believes that they would choose to split the 
wealth equally or that they believe others will do so, which is highly inconsistent with the actual 
data.31 In order to predict behavior, we find it necessary to combine the elicited norm ratings 
with the self-interested motive in Equation 1, and find support for both motives in parameter 
estimation, meaning that the norm ratings alone do not simply track behavior independently.  
 It is also important to note some of the limitations in our results. For example, while our 
analysis shows that relatively stable weights on money and on social appropriateness can explain 
changes in behavior across experiments and treatments, there are some aspects of the data that 
these stable weights get wrong. For example, our analysis using weights derived form $10 
dictator games to predict behavior in dictator games with $5 stakes generally predicts too much 
fair behavior (see Online Appendix). This is consistent with the intuition provided by an 
anonymous reviewer that, under significantly higher stakes, our predictions are very likely to 
require different sets of weights on money and social appropriateness. Therefore, an approach 
that more thoroughly identifies the relationship between social appropriateness and monetary 
considerations constitutes valuable future research.  
 Another limitation is that we study a relatively simple set of contexts – all variants of the 
dictator game. The relationship between social norms, as elicited with our method, and behavior 
may be more complex in other games, such as public goods games and trust games, where 
reciprocity and uncertainty may play a greater role. Nevertheless, at least for a first step, our 
admittedly simple approach has considerable value in explaining changing behavior across 
several experiments, and presents a useful starting point from which to build an improved 
understanding of social norms. 
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Table 1. Elicited norms (N(ak)) for bully vs. standard dictator environments (data from Experiment 1) 
 
Action 
(final wealth) 
Standard (n = 107) 
(Initial wealth: $10, $0) 
Bully (n = 92) 
(Initial wealth: $5, $5) 
rank-
sum test 
(z) Action Mean - - - + + + Action Mean - - - + + + 
$10, $0 “Give $0” -0.80 82% 10% 3% 5% “Take $5” -0.90 91% 5% 0% 3% 1.85* 
$9, $1 “Give $1” -0.64 61% 31% 3% 6% “Take $4” -0.83 82% 14% 1% 3% 3.13*** 
$8, $2 “Give $2” -0.44 35% 51% 10% 4% “Take $3” -0.67 55% 40% 3% 1% 3.27*** 
$7, $3 “Give $3” -0.16 8% 62% 26% 4% “Take $2” -0.38 28% 53% 16% 2% 3.34*** 
$6, $4 “Give $4” 0.14 3% 30% 61% 7% “Take $1” -0.09 12% 46% 36% 7% 3.42*** 
$5, $5 “Give $5” 0.87 0% 3% 14% 83% “Give $0” / “Take $0” 0.93 0% 0% 11% 89% 1.26 
$4, $6 “Give $6” 0.57 0% 7% 50% 43% “Give $1” 0.48 4% 12% 40% 43% 0.72 
$3, $7 “Give $7” 0.42 1% 22% 39% 37% “Give $2” 0.31 7% 23% 38% 33% 1.12 
$2, $8 “Give $8” 0.32 6% 31% 23% 40% “Give $3” 0.20 14% 27% 23% 36% 1.08 
$1, $9 “Give $9” 0.22 17% 24% 19% 40% “Give $4” 0.10 27% 16% 21% 31% 0.99 
$0, $10 “Give $10” 0.18 26% 13% 18% 43% “Give $5” 0.04 36% 10% 16% 38% 1.13 
* - p < 0.1, ** - p < 0.05, *** - p < 0. 01; all two-tailed 
Responses are: “very socially inappropriate” (- -), “somewhat socially inappropriate” (-), “somewhat socially appropriate” (+), “very 
socially appropriate” (+ +); modal response are shaded. To construct the mean ratings, we converted responses into numerical scores 
(“very socially inappropriate” = -1, “somewhat socially inappropriate” = -1/3, “somewhat socially appropriate” = 1/3, “very socially 
appropriate” = 1).  
 31 
Table 2. Statistical tests of behavior across bully vs. standard treatments (data from 
Experiment 2)  
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent 
variable: 
Amount allocated to 
recipient 
Binary 
(Share = $5) 
Binary 
(Share = $0) 
Bully 0.678
** 
(0.210) 
1.570*** 
(0.390) 
0.532** 
(0.248) 
Class size -0.011
* 
(0.006) 
-0.018*** 
(0.004) 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
Constant  0.585 (0.654) 
0.091 
(0.536) 
N 106 97 71 
Model: Ordered logistic regression Logistic regression Logistic regression 
Sample: All data Subjects who allocated less than $6 to recipient 
Subjects who allocated 
less than $5 to recipient 
* - p < 0.1, ** - p < 0.05, *** - p < 0. 01; all two-tailed 
Standard errors (clustered by session) are in parentheses. 
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Table 3. Conditional (fixed-effects) logit estimation of choice determinants across experiments (includes mean appropriateness 
ratings from Experiment 1 as an explanatory variable) 
 
Behavioral data 
(experimental treatment) 
Experiment 2 
(Standard vs. Bully) 
Lazear, et al. (2012) 
(Standard vs. Sorting) 
List  (2007) 
(Standard vs. Take $1) 
Data from all three 
experiments 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Monetary Payoff (β) 0.656
*** 
(0.132) 
0.630*** 
(0.138) 
0.811*** 
(0.075) 
0.810*** 
(0.075) 
1.456*** 
(0.408) 
1.312*** 
(0.401) 
0.750*** 
(0.060) 
0.808*** 
(0.105) 
Appropriateness rating (γ) 1.858
*** 
(0.410) 
1.556*** 
(0.521) 
2.304*** 
(0.287) 
2.283*** 
(0.312) 
1.941** 
(0.921) 
1.982** 
(0.843) 
1.856*** 
(0.204) 
2.192*** 
(0.326) 
Appropriateness rating X 
non-standard treatment  
0.374 
(0.326)  
0.062 
(0.331)  
-0.629 
(0.593)   
Monetary payoff X 
Lazear, et al., experiment        
-0.094 
(0.127) 
Appropriateness rating X 
Lazear, et al., experiment        
-0.125 
(0.470) 
Monetary payoff X 
List experiment        
0.426 
(0.391) 
Appropriateness rating X 
List experiment        
-1.029 
(1.038) 
2γ/β 5.66
*** 
(0.49) 
4.94*** 
(0.98) 
5.68*** 
(0.39) 
5.64*** 
(0.48) 
2.67*** 
(0.98) 
3.02*** 
(0.90) 
4.95*** 
(0.29) 
5.43*** 
(0.30) 
Log-likelihood -208.5 -207.7 -308.8 -308.7 -126.8 -126.1 -672.3 -649.8 
Obs.  
(subjects) 
1166 
(106) 
1166 
(106) 
2105 
(183) 
2015 
(183) 
816 
(70) 
816 
(70) 
4087 
(359) 
4087 
(359) 
* - p < 0.1, ** - p < 0.05, *** - p < 0. 01; all two-tailed 
Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses.  The variable “appropriateness rating” converts subject responses in Experiment 1 to numerical scores (“very 
socially inappropriate” = -1, “somewhat socially inappropriate” = -1/3, “somewhat socially appropriate” = 1/3, “very socially appropriate” = 1).  
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Figure 1A. Distributions of amounts shared in standard vs. bully treatments (data from 
Experiment 2)  
 
 
Figure 1B. Predicted distributions of amounts shared in standard vs. bully treatments 
(based on coefficients in Table 3, Model 1) 
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Figure 2A. Distributions of amounts shared in standard vs. sorting treatments (data from 
Experiments 1 and 2 of Lazear et al. 2012) 
 
 
Figure 2B. Predicted distributions of amounts shared in standard vs. sorting treatments 
(based on coefficients in Table 3, Model 3) 
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Figure 3. Mean ratings of social appropriateness from standard vs. sorting treatments 
(data from Experiment 1) 
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Figure 4A. Distributions of amounts shared in standard vs. take $1 treatments (data from 
List 2007) 
 
 
Figure 4B. Predicted distributions of amounts shared in standard vs. take $1 treatments 
(based on coefficients in Table 3, Model 5)
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Figure 5. Mean ratings of social appropriateness from standard vs. take $1 treatments 
(data from Experiment 1) 
 
 
 
